[1] Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp- 44-55. 187-198.
[2] Melvin R. Laird, intra.. The Conservative Papers (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., 1964).
[3] See, e.g., Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), chapter II, “Coup d’état at the
Hotel Pierre.”
[4] The relevant passage in Nixon’s first Inaugural address reads:
After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.
Let all nations know that during this Administration our lines of communication will be open.
We seek an open world—open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people—a world in which no
people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.
We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy.
Those who would be our adversaries, we invite to a peaceful competition—not in conquering territory or
extending dominion, but in enriching the life of man.
As we explore the reaches of space, let us go to the new worlds together—not as new worlds to be
conquered, but as a new adventure to be shared.
With those who are willing to join, let us cooperate to reduce the burden of arms, to strengthen the
structure of peace, to lift up the poor and the hungry.
But to all those who would be tempted by weakness, let us leave no doubt that we will be as strong as we need
to be for as long as we need to be.
III
The Convictions of an Apprentice Statesman
[5] I have discussed the concept of “containment” in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and
Bros., 1957), chapter 2. An excellent analysis may be found in Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1963).
[6] US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the
Military Situation in the Far East, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, p. 2083.
[7] Speech at Llandudno, Wales, Oct. 9, 1948, quoted in New York Times, Oct. 10, 1948.
[8] “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” in Kermit Gordon, ed., Agenda for the Nation (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 614.
IV
European Journey
[9] “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” in Kermit Gordon, ed., Agenda for the Nation (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 595.
[10] The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 40.
[11] See Walt W. Rostow, “Limits and Responsibilities of American Power,” speech at Texas A & M University, Dec. 4,
1968 (in Department of State Bulletin, vol. LX, no. 1541, Jan. 6, 1969).
[12] See Francis M. Bator, “The Politics of Alliance: The United States and Western Europe,” in Gordon, ed., Agenda
for the Nation, p. 339.
[13] Alastair Buchan, Europe’s Futures, Europe’s Choices (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. vii.
[14] See Andre Malraux, Felled Oaks: Conversation with de Gaulle (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p.
30.
[15] “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” in Gordon, ed., Agenda for the Nation, p. 599.
[16] Address by President de Gaulle on May 31, 1960, in Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of
General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958-January 31, 1964 (New York: French Embassy, Press and Information
Division, 1964), p. 75.
[17] Ibid., p. 78.
[18] Press conference of May 15, 1962, Major Addresses, p. 176.
[19] Press conference of Sept. 5, 1960. Major Addresses, pp. 92-93.
V
Opening Moves with Moscow
[20] V. I. Lenin, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1943), vol. 9, pp. 242 and 267, quoted by Nathan
Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, III.: The Free Press, 1953), p. 347.
[21] Nikita Khrushchev, Report to the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU, February 1956, Current Digest of the
Soviet Press, vol. 8 (March 7, 1956), pp. 11-12.
[22] Nikolai Podgorny, in Pravda, November 20, 1973.
[23] Lenin, Selected Works, vol. 10, p. 119, quoted by Leites, p. 495.
[25] New York Times, May 23, 1943.
[26] Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Co., 1944), p. 406.
[27] Averell Harriman, Peace with Russia (New York, 1959), p. 168.
[28] “Why We Treat Different Communist Countries Differently,” address by Secretary Rusk, Washington, D.C., Feb.
25, 1964 (in Department of State Bulletin, vol. L, no. 1290, March 16, 1964, p. 393).
[29] Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper and Bros., 1948), p. 870.
[30] See Max Frankel, “Where Do We Go From Victory?” The Reporter, Nov. 22, 1962, p. 24.
[31] Macmillan’s closing statement at Geneva Foreign Ministers’ Conference, Nov. 16, 1955, quoted in Documents on
International Affairs 1955 (Oxford: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958), pp. 73-77.
[32] “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” in Kermit Gordon, ed., Agenda for the Nation (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 609.
[33] The Necessity for Choice (New York: Harper and Bros., 1961), pp. 195-196.
[34] Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Peace and Power,” Encounter, vol. XXXI, no. 5 (November 1968), p. 13.
[35] Marshall D. Shulman, “The Future of the Soviet-American Competition,” in Soviet-American Relations and World
Order: The Two and the Many, Adelphi Paper No. 66 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, March 1970), p. 10.
[36] Clifford speech quoted by Senator Albert Gore in US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International
Organization and Disarmament Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st sess., March 21, 1969, p. 165.
[37] See, e.g., Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “Nixon’s Trip Plans May Affect Talks,” Washington Post, July 6, 1969; James
Reston, “President Nixon’s Avoidable Blunders,” New York Times, June 29, 1969; and editorial in New York
Times, June 30, 1969.
[39] The Necessity For Choice (New York: Harper and Bros., 1961), p. 202. In my book on Europe, published in 1965, I
saw some merit in President de Gaulle’s conception of China as a necessary counterweight to the Soviet Union,
though I tended also to regard China as an objective problem for the United States’ “global responsibilities.” The
Troubled Partnership (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 59-60.
[40] Most of what we know of what took place on the Ussuri River is based on the published accounts of both sides.
These accounts are analyzed in Thomas W. Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development,
and the March 1969 Clashes, The Rand Corp., August 1970 (RM-6171-PR). See also Neville Maxwell, “The Chinese
Account of the 1969 Fighting at Chenpao,” The China Quarterly, no. 56 (October-December 1973), p. 730.
[41] Maxwell, “The Chinese Account,” p. 731.
[42] See the Washington Star of Aug. 28 and 29, 1969. The Star felt free to break the “background” rule because it
had not been invited to the luncheon.
VII
Defense Policy and Strategy
[43] Kuznetsov quoted in Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History 1929-1969 (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1973),
pp. 495-496.
[44] Albert Wohlstetter, “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?” Foreign Policy, no. 15 (Summer I974), PP- 3-20; “Rivals But
No ‘Race,’ “Foreign Policy, no. 16 (Fall 1974), pp. 48-81.
[45] This was the title of a book by Senator J. William Fulbright: The Pentagon Propaganda Machine (New York:
Random House, 1970, and Vintage Books, 1971).
[46] Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden, eds., American Militarism 1970 (New York: The Viking Press, 1969), p. 11.
See also John W. Finney, “45 in Congress Seek Rein on Military,” New York Times, June 3, 1969.
[47] Neil Sheehan, “Congress Group Hopes to Use ABM Fight to Curb Other Arms,” New York Times, July 10, 1969.
[48] See Congressional Quarterly, May 30, 1969, p. 847. See also the editorial in the March 8, 1969, Saturday Review
(“The Anti-Ballistic Missile Decision: President Nixon’s Vietnam?”), reprinted in the New York Times, March 11,
1969, p. 19.
[49] Carl Kaysen, “Military Strategy, Military Forces, and Arms Control,” in Kermit Gordon, ed., Agenda for the Nation
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 549-584 (quote is at 549-550); Charles L. Schultze, “Budget
Alternatives after Vietnam,” ibid., pp. 13-48.
[50] Graham Allison, Ernest May, and Adam Yarmolinsky, “Limits to Intervention,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 48, no. 2
(January 1970), p. 246.
[51] New York Times, April 21, 1969.
[52] New York Times, May 18, 1969.
[53] New York Times editorials, Feb. 7 and Feb. 9, 1969.
[54] Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner, eds., ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile
System, with an introduction by Senator Edward M. Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).
[55] Statement by Senator Edward M. Kennedy to the Committee on National Priorities, Democratic Policy Council,
Feb. 24, 1970. See also New York Times, Feb. 25, 1970.
[56] Nixon’s remarks, while originally made on a background basis, were later released for publication in the 1969
volume of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon: 1969 (Washington: US
Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 544-556.
VIII
The Agony of Vietnam
[57] That all the key decisions even in the early 1960s were public knowledge is demonstrated convincingly by Henry
Fairlie, “We Knew What We Were Doing When We Went Into Vietnam,” Washington Monthly (May 1973).
[58] “The Viet Nam Negotiations,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 47, no. 2 (January 1969), pp. 211-234.
[59] Addicts of secret documents may read this NSC staff summary of the agencies’ responses to NSSM 1 in the
Washington Post of April 25, 1972.
[60] See Chapter XII, note 11.
[61] Under the Hague Convention of 1907, a neutral country has the obligation not to allow its territory to be used by
a belligerent. If the neutral country is unwilling or unable to prevent this, the other belligerent has the right to
take appropriate counteraction. See the address by State Department Legal Adviser John Stevenson to the Bar
Association of the City of New York on May 28, 1970, explaining our legal position with respect to operations in
Cambodia by US and South Vietnamese forces from April 30 to June 30, 1970 (in Department of State Bulletin,
vol. LXII, June 22, 1970, pp. 765-770).
[62] The full House Judiciary Committee voted 26-12 not to put forward this proposed article of impeachment. The
colorful phrases quoted, and others, may be found in US Congress, House, Report of the Committee on the
Judiciary on the Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, 93d Cong., 2d sess., Aug. 20,
1974: p. 298 (Rep. Waldie, “massive bombing of neutral Cambodia”); p. 308 (Rep. Drinan, “Presidential conduct
more shocking…” etc.); see also pp. 307, 312 (Rep. Drinan, “a massive bombing.” “massive bombing in a neutral
country”); and p. 328 (Rep. Holtzman joined by nine others, “the systematic bombing of a neutral country”).
[63] Robert F. Kennedy, To Seek a Newer World (Bantam Books, April 1968), especially pp. 207-218. Kennedy wrote:
“Withdrawal is now impossible” (p. 186) and “A negotiated settlement must be less than a victory for either
side… For either side to yield its minimum conditions would be in fact to surrender” (pp. 196-197).
[64] See John W. Finney, “Rockefeller Coup Gave Platform a Dovish Tone,” New York Times, Aug. 6, 1968.
[65] Clark M. Clifford, “A Viet Nam Reappraisal,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 47, no. 4 (July 1969).
[66] The text of Nixon’s July 15 letter to Ho Chi Minh and of Ho’s reply was released by the White House at the time
of Nixon’s Nov. 3, 1969, speech on Vietnam.
[67] MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT September 10, 1969
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Our Present Course in Vietnam
I have become deeply concerned about our present course on Vietnam. This memorandum is to inform
you of the reasons for my concern. It does not discuss alternative courses of action, but is provided for your
background consideration. You know my recommendations.
While time acts against both us and our enemy, it runs more quickly against our strategy than against
theirs. This pessimistic view is based on my view of Hanoi’s strategy and the probable success of the various
elements of our own.
I. U.S. Strategy
In effect, we are attempting to solve the problem of Vietnam on three highly interrelated fronts; (1)
within the U.S., (2) in Vietnam, and (3) through diplomacy. To achieve our basic goals through diplomacy, we
must be reasonably successful on both of the other two fronts.
a. U.S.
The pressure of public opinion on you to resolve the war quickly will increase—and I believe increase
greatly—during the coming months. While polls may show that large numbers of Americans now are satisfied
with the Administration’s handling of the war, the elements of an evaporation of this support are clearly
present. The plans for student demonstrations in October are well known, and while many Americans will
oppose the students’ activities, they will also be reminded of their own opposition to the continuation of the
war. As mentioned below, I do not believe that “Vietnamization” can significantly reduce the pressures for an
end to the war, and may, in fact, increase them after a certain point. Particularly significant is the clear
opposition of many “moderate” leaders of opinion, particularly in the press and in the East (e.g., Life Magazine).
The result of the recrudescence of intense public concern must be to polarize public opinion. You will then be
somewhat in the same position as was President Johnson, although the substance of your position will be
different. You will be caught between the Hawks and the Doves.
The effect of these public pressures on the U.S. Government will be to accentuate the internal
divisiveness that has already become apparent to the public and Hanoi. Statements by government officials
which attempt to assuage the Hawks or Doves will serve to confuse Hanoi but also to confirm it in its course of
waiting us out.
b. Vietnam
Three elements on the Vietnam front must be considered—(1) our efforts to “win the war” through
military operations and pacification, (2) “Vietnamization,” and (3) the political position of the GVN.
(1) I do not believe that with our current plans we can win the war within two years, although our success
or failure in hurting the enemy remains very important.
(2) “Vietnamization” must be considered both with regard to its prospects for allowing us to turn the war
over to the Vietnamese, and with regard to its effect on Hanoi and U.S. public opinion. 1 am not optimistic
about the ability of the South Vietnamese armed forces to assume a larger part of the burden than current
MACV plans allow. These plans, however, call for a thirty-month period in which to turn the burden of the war
over to the GVN. I do not believe we have this much time.
In addition, “Vietnamization” will run into increasingly serious problems as we proceed down its path.
— Withdrawal of U.S. troops will become like salted peanuts to the American public: the more U.S. troops
come home, the more will be demanded. This could eventually result, in effect, in demands for unilateral
withdrawal—perhaps within a year.
— The more troops are withdrawn, the more Hanoi will be encouraged—they are the last people we will
be able to fool about the ability of the South Vietnamese to take over from us. They have the option of
attacking GVN forces to embarrass us throughout the process or of waiting until we have largely withdrawn
before doing so (probably after a period of higher infiltration).
— Each U.S. soldier that is withdrawn will be relatively more important to the effort in the South, as he
will represent a higher percentage of U.S. forces than did his predecessor. (We need not, of course, continue to
withdraw combat troops but can emphasize support troops in the next increments withdrawn. Sooner or later,
however, we must be getting at the guts of our operations there).
— It will become harder and harder to maintain the morale of those who remain, not to speak of their
mothers.
— “Vietnamization” may not lead to reduction in U.S. casualties until its final stages, as our casualty rate
may be unrelated to the total number of American troops in South Vietnam. To kill about 150 U.S. soldiers a
week, the enemy needs to attack only a small portion of our forces.
— “Vietnamization” depends on broadening the GVN, and Thieu’s new government is not significantly
broader than the old (see below). The best way to broaden the GVN would be to create the impression that the
Saigon government is winning or at least permanent. The more uncertainty there is about the outcome of the
war, the less the prospect for “Vietnamization.”
(3) We face a dilemma with the GVN: The present GVN cannot go much farther towards a political
settlement without seriously endangering its own existence; but at the same time, it has not gone far enough to
make such a settlement likely.
Thieu’s failure to “broaden” his government is disturbing, but not because he failed to include a greater
variety of Saigon’s Tea House politicians. It is disturbing because these politicians clearly do not believe that
Thieu and his government represent much hope for future power, and because the new government does not
offer much of a bridge to neutralist figures who could play a role in a future settlement. This is not to mention
his general failure to build up political strength in non-Catholic villages. In addition, as U.S. troops are
withdrawn, Thieu becomes more dependent on the political support of the South Vietnamese military.
c. Diplomatic Front
There is not therefore enough of a prospect of progress in Vietnam to persuade Hanoi to make real
concessions in Paris. Their intransigence is also based on their estimate of growing U.S. domestic opposition to
our Vietnam policies. It looks as though they are prepared to try to wait us out.
II. Hanoi’s Strategy
There is no doubt that the enemy has been hurt by allied military actions in the South, and is not capable
of maintaining the initiative on a sustained basis there. Statistics on enemy-initiated activities, as well as some
of Giap’s recent statements, indicate a conscious decision by Hanoi to settle down to a strategy of “protracted
warfare.” This apparently consists of small unit actions with “high point” flurries of activity, and emphasis on
inflicting U.S. casualties (particularly through rocket and mortar attacks). This pattern of actions seems clearly to
indicate a low-cost strategy aimed at producing a psychological, rather than military, defeat for the U.S.
This view of their strategy is supported by our estimates of enemy infiltration. They could infiltrate more
men, according to intelligence estimates, despite growing domestic difficulties. The only logical reason for their
not having done so is that more men were not needed in the pipeline—at least for a few months—to support a
lower-cost strategy of protracted warfare. It seems most unlikely that they are attempting to “signal” to us a
desire for a de facto mutual withdrawal, although this cannot be discounted. There is no diplomatic sign of
this—except in Xuan Thuy’s linkage of points two and three of the PRG program—and I do not believe they trust
us enough to “withdraw” a larger percentage of their men than we have of ours, as they would be doing.
Hanoi’s adoption of a strategy designed to wait us out fits both with its doctrine of how to fight a
revolutionary war and with its expectations about increasingly significant problems for the U.S.
III. Conclusion
In brief, I do not believe we can make enough evident progress in Vietnam to hold the line within the U.S.
(and the U.S. Government), and Hanoi has adopted a strategy which it should be able to maintain for some
time—barring some break like Sino-Soviet hostilities. Hence my growing concern.
[68] My memorandum for the President of Sept. 11, 1969, argued, inter alia:
Given the history of over-optimistic reports on Vietnam the past few years, it would be practically
impossible to convince the American people that the other side is hurting and therefore with patience, time
could be on our side. First of all we are not sure about our relative position—we have misread indicators many
times before. Secondly, even if we conclude that the allied military position is sound, we don’t know how to
translate this into political terms—and the political prospects in South Vietnam are much shakier. Thirdly, the
Administration faces an extremely skeptical and cynical American audience—the President is rightly reluctant to
appear optimistic and assume his own credibility gap. Finally, to a large and vocal portion of the dissenters in
this country, the strength of the allied position is irrelevant—they want an end to the war at any price.
[69] The New York Times Magazine, Sept. 21, 1969.
[70] For example, on March 1, 1969, the Times cited the easing of the Communist offensive as an occasion to pursue
negotiation. The Communists’ conciliatory response to Nixon’s May 14 speech was cited on May 18 as a reason
for the US to commence withdrawal. On June 10, an editorial cited the closeness of the NLF Ten Points and the
Nixon program as a reason for the US to discuss a coalition government. Editorials of July 28, Aug. 25, and Aug.
31 pointed to the lull in the fighting as an argument for American de-escalation and a cease-fire proposal.
[71] An editorial of March 9, 1969, argued that the enemy’s spring offensive only proved that a US military victory
was impossible and the peace talks had to be pursued. On July 28, Hanoi’s stalling in the Paris talks was a reason
to accelerate US withdrawals. The enemy’s August 11-12 wave of attacks prompted the Times on August 16 to
urge US de-escalation and a ceasefire proposal.
[72] See editorials of Dec. 26, 1968, and Jan. 19, 1969 (mutual withdrawal); Jan. 30 and March 21 (US to initiate
mutual withdrawals); May 18 (unilateral US withdrawals); and May 31 (timetable for US withdrawal).
[73] Jan. 30, 1969 (“initiate”); March 21 (“begin”); May 31 (50-100,000 as “substantial”); June 10 (“step toward
disengagement”); Sept. 17 (“timid,” not “significant”); Sept. 27 (not “adequate”); Oct. 2 (“token”).
[74] See editorials of May 14, 1969 (coalition electoral commission); June 10 (interim coalition).
[75] April 3, 1969 (cutback of search-and-destroy missions); Aug. 5, Oct. 15, 1969 (call for ceasefire).
[76] Jan. 19, 1969 (mutual troop withdrawal); Jan. 30 (US troop withdrawal); April 3 (reduction of search-and-destroy
missions; US troop withdrawal); May 14, May 15, June 10 (coalition electoral commission); May 18 (US troop
withdrawal); Aug. 5, Aug. 16, Aug. 30 (cutback of offensive operations; standstill cease-fire); Sept. 7 (cease-fire
for Ho’s funeral).
[77] E.g., July 28, 1969 (US troop withdrawal).
[78] Jan. 19, Jan. 30, 1969 (troop withdrawal, after bombing halt); April 3, 1969 (reduction of search-and-destroy
missions, after B-52 cutback); May 15 (coalition electoral commission, after May 14 speech); May 18 (unilateral
troop withdrawal, after May 14 speech); June 10 (interim coalition, after June withdrawal announcement); Aug.
5, Aug. 16, Aug. 30 (cease-fire, defensive ground tactics, after June withdrawal announcement); Oct. 2 (after
September withdrawal announcement).
[79] E.g., May 5, 1969 (continued pursuit of military victory); May 17 (failure to slow down offensive operations;
delay in withdrawing troops); Aug. 16 (failure to propose cease-fire or deescalation); Aug. 25 (delay in
withdrawing troops); Aug. 31 (continued military pressure; ignoring lull; delay in withdrawing troops); Oct. 2
(aggressive ground tactics; tokenism of withdrawals, ignoring Ho funeral truce).
[80] E.g., May 5, 1969 (jailing of opponents; procrastination with land reform); May 17 (jailing of opponents); Aug. 25
(choice of new Premier); Sept. 12 (balking at Ho funeral truce).
[81] E.g., March 1, 1969 (total bombing halt); May 15, May 17, 1969 (May 14 speech); Aug. 16, Oct. 2, 1969 (troop
withdrawal, etc.).
[82] E.g., March 1, 1969 (easing of Communist attacks); May 9, 1969 (Front’s Ten Points); May 18, 1969 (initial
response to May 14 speech); July 28, Aug. 25, Aug. 31, 1969 (lulls); Aug. 16, 1969 (“virtual cessation” of
infiltration).
[83] March 9, May 5, 1969 (step-up in allied attacks); Aug. 25, Aug. 31, 1969 (lull in fighting).
[84] E.g., April 3, 1969 (cutback of search-and-destroy missions); May 5, May 17 (defensive posture, US withdrawal);
May 18 (US withdrawal); June 10 (interim coalition); Sept. 5 (Ho Chi Minh funeral truce).
[85] New York Times, May 15, 1969; Washington Post, June 23, 1969.
[86] New York Times, May 15, May 30, 1969
IX
Early Tests in Asia
[87] Information in this paragraph is from the unclassified testimony of General Earle Wheeler to a subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee, April 25, 1969.
[88] This portion of the Nixon-Sato communiqué reads as follows:
The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear
weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his
deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United States
Government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,
the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese
Government as described by the Prime Minister. [Emphasis added.]
[89] See, e.g., I. M. Destler, et al., Managing an Alliance: The Politics of US-Japanese Relations (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 156, a book that I found otherwise a useful summary of the public events.
[90] See, e.g., Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 104-105.
X
Words and Shadows
[91] Fatah policy statement of Oct. 19, 1968, reported in the New York Times, Oct. 20, 1968.
[92] See the report of Andrei Zhdanov to the conference of Communist Parties establishing the Cominform,
September 1947, reprinted in US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Strategy and Tactics of
World Communism, Report to Subcommittee, No. 5 on National and International Movements, House Document
No. 619, Supplement I, 80th Cong., 2d session, 1948, p. 211. Zhdanov essentially treated the Middle East as in
transition from the British to the American sphere of influence.
[93] See Arnaud de Borchgrave’s interview with Nasser in Newsweek of Feb. 10, 1969, and his interview with Eshkol in
Newsweek of Feb. 17, 1969.
XI
The Uneasy Alliance
[94] See, e.g., a column by C. L. Sulzberger in the New York Times, Dec. 7, 1969.
[95] See, e.g., Congressional Record (daily ed.), May 18, 1971, p. S7217, quoted in John New-house et al., US Troops in
Europe: Issues, Costs, and Choices (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971), p. 5.
[96] See US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Security Agreements and Commitments
Abroad: United States Forces in Europe, Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements
and Commitments Abroad, 91st Cong., 2d sess., Pt. 10, testimony of June 24, 1970, p. 2243.
[97] Willy Brandt, People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1978), p. 248.
[98] Ibid., p. 289.
XII
The War Widens
[99] Walters’s richly detailed account is in Vernon A. Walters, Silent Missions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co.,
1978), chapters 24 and 28.
[100] Ibid., pp. 580-582.
[101] On earlier Vietnamese dominance of Laos and Cambodia, see Bernard Fall, The Two Vietnams, rev. ed. (London:
Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 12-19, 33.
[102] Ibid., p. 386.
[103] See, e.g.,New York Times, Feb. 25, 1970.
[104] Sihanouk interview in New York Times, March 12, 1970.
[105] See his memoirs, My War with the CIA: The Memoirs of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as Related to Wilfred Burchett
(New York: Random House, Pantheon Books, 1973), p. 24. See also pp. 21-22, 24-26, 42-43, 50, 54, 201-202.
[106] William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1979), p. 165.
[107] Following is the text of the entire message:
MEMORANDUM FOR Henry Kissinger
FROM THE PRESIDENT
I think we need a bold move in Cambodia, assuming that I feel the way today (it is five AM, April 22) at our
meeting as I feel this morning to show that we stand with Lon Nol. I do not believe he is going to survive. There
is, however, some chance that he might and in any event we must do something symbolic to help him survive.
We have really dropped the ball on this one due to the fact that we were taken in with the line that by helping
him we would destroy his “neutrality” and give the North Vietnamese an excuse to come in. Over and over again
we fail to learn that the Communists never need an excuse to come in. They didn’t need one in Hungary in 1956
when the same argument was made by the career State people and when Dulles bought it because he was tired
and it was during the campaign. They didn’t need one in Czechoslovakia when the same argument was made by
the State people, and they didn’t need one in Laos where we lost a precious day by failing to make the strike that
might have blunted the whole offensive before it got started, and in Cambodia where we have taken a
completely hands-off attitude by protesting to the Senate that we have only a “delegation of seven State
Department jerks” in the Embassy and would not provide any aid of any kind because we were fearful that if we
did so it would give them a “provocation” to come in. They are romping in there and the only government in
Cambodia in the last 25 years that had the guts to take a pro-Western and pro-American stand is ready to fall. I
am thinking of someone like Bob Murphy who would be sent there on a trip to report back to me and who would
go in and reassure Lon Nol. This, of course, would be parallel to your activities which will be undertaken
immediately after the NSC meeting, in the event that I decide to go on this course, with some of the lily-livered
Ambassadors from our so-called friends in the world. We are going to find out who our friends are now, because
if we decide to stand up here some of the rest of them had better come along fast.
I will talk to you about this after the NSC meeting.
[108] John Mitchell took notes of the meeting and wrote a concise two-page memorandum:
MEMORANDUM OF MEETING April 28,
PRESENT: The President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General
SUBJECT: Cambodia/South Vietnam
The subject meeting was held in the Oval Office of The President on Tuesday, April 28, 1970, commencing
at 10:20 a.m. and lasting for approximately twenty minutes.
The President stated that the purpose of the meeting was to advise those present of the decisions he had
reached with respect to the developing situation in South Vietnam and Cambodia. The President further stated
that he had had the subject under constant consideration for the past ten days and had taken into consideration
all of the information provided by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Admiral
McCain and his staff at the briefing in Hawaii. The President further stated that, in arriving at his decision, he
had taken into consideration the positions taken by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense in
opposition to the use of U.S. Forces in Cambodia and the fact that Dr. Kissinger was leaning against the
recommendation of such use.
The President further stated that the previous day he had made certain inquiries of Ambassador Bunker
and General Abrams. The President read his communication to Ambassador Bunker and the Ambassador’s reply
received late Monday evening.
The President further stated that, based upon his review of the general Cambodian situation, he had
decided not to change the current U.S. position with respect to military assistance to Cambodia or his
authorization for the ARVN operation in the Parrot’s Beak. The President further stated that he had decided to
confirm the authorization for a combined U.S./GVN operation against COSVN headquarters in Fish Hook in order
to protect U.S. Forces in South Vietnam. The President expressed the opinion that the COSVN operation was
necessary in order to sustain the continuation of the Vietnamization Program and would possibly help in, but
not detract from, U.S. efforts to negotiate peace.
The President further stated that he had taken into consideration, in arriving at his decisions, the probable
adverse reaction in some Congressional circles and some segments of the public. The President further stated
that, in order to establish the record of the events leading to his decisions and the advice he had received
concerning the subject matter thereof, the previous evening he had dictated a tape which included the contrary
recommendations of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.
At the close of the President’s statements he left the Oval Office to attend another meeting in the Cabinet
Room. There was no discussion of the subject matter of the meeting by others in attendance during the
presence of the President.
[Signed:] J. N. Mitchell
[109] See Elizabeth Becker, “Cambodia: A Look at Border War with Vietnam,” Washington Post, Dec. 27, 1978; Henry
Kamm, “Pol Pot Confirmed Assertion by Nixon,” New York Times, March 18, 1979, p. 7.
[110] New York Times, May 18, 1970.
[111] See e.g., Stanley Karnow, “Cambodia: Nixon’s the One,” Washington Post, Jan. 12, 1979.
[112] See e.g., William Shawcross, “Cambodia: The Blame,” The Sunday Times (London), Dec. 12, 1976; “Who ‘Lost’
Cambodia?” New York Times, Feb. 6, 1979; Sideshow, passim.
[113] E.g., Shawcross, Sideshow, pp. 372-373, 389. Shawcross, who thus excused the Khmer Rouge atrocities, was
amazingly upbraided in turn by another writer who alleged that there was insufficient evidence the atrocities
ever took place. Richard Dudman, The New York Times Book Review, April 22, 1979. Some of our critics seem to
be ready to give Pol Pot the benefit of the doubt before their own government.
[114] See also Sihanouk’s interview in the Far Eastern Economic Review, May 11, 1979, p. 14, in which he described Pol
Pot as a “butcher” responsible for the deaths of two million Cambodians.
[115] An excellent analysis of the Khmer Rouge’s methodical application of ideological doctrine is by Francois
Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year Zero (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977). The quotation from Khieu
Samphan’s dissertation is on p. 87.
[116] Congressional Record (daily ed.), Dec. 16, 1970, pp. S20283, 20289 ff.
XIII
The Soviet Riddle
[117] Charles L. Schultze with Edward K. Hamilton and Allen Schick, Setting National Priorities: The 1971 Budget
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1970), chapter 2.
[118] Quoted in the New York Times, Feb. 24, 1970.
[119] See, e.g., an article in Commentary in March 1970 that denounced Nixon for his ABM program, MIRV testing, and
laxity in pursuing limitations in SALT: Maurice J. Goldbloom, “Nixon So Far,” Commentary (March 1970), pp. 30-
31
[120] My staff summed up for me Dave Packard’s recommendations that it was urgent that we negotiate limits on
offensive systems as soon as possible:
Secretary Packard has sent you a memo on SALT objectives and tactics. In it he argues that the Delegation
should be given new instructions “with which we can attempt to achieve an agreement at Vienna by mid-October
or, at the latest, November.” He says an early, though limited, agreement is important because the coming
“squeeze on the national budget” which is “likely” to result in “large reductions in defense programs, including
strategic forces,” has a “significant effect on the timing of our SALT tactics.” This, he says, is because cuts dictated
by the budget will be more acceptable in the U.S. and a “sign of good intentions” to the USSR if there has been
progress at SALT but would “decrease our bargaining leverage” if there had not.
(It would be interesting to know what cuts in strategic programs DOD plans which would “decrease our
bargaining leverage” this fall.)
XV
The Autumn of Crises: Jordan
[121] See Henry Brandon, The Retreat of American Power (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1973). p. 134.
XVI
The Autumn of Crises: Cienfuegos
[122] RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 220-221.
[123] Reported, for example, in the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 3, 1970.
[124] New York Times, Jan. 6, 1971.
XVII
The Autumn of Crises: Chile
[125] See Paul E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1977), p. 89. The text of the Popular Unity program may be found in J. Ann Zammit, ed., The
Chilean Road to Socialism (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973), pp. 255-284.
[126] See Régis Debray, The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende (New York: Random House, Pantheon
Books, 1971), p. 159
[127] Ibid., p. 119.
[128] Ibid., p. 120.
[129] Ibid., p. 118.
[130] Ibid., p. 117.
[131] Ibid., p. 118.
[132] Ibid., pp. 122-123.
[133] Ibid., p. 82.
[134] Under President Ford’s intelligence reorganization of 1976 it was renamed the Operations Advisory Group;
under President Carter the same functions are carried out by a similar committee called the NSC Special
Coordination Committee, under Executive Order 12036, Jan. 24, 1978.
[135] US Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report, 94th Cong., 1st sess.,
November 1975, p. 229.
[136] Debray, The Chilean Revolution, pp. 123-125.
[137] Interview with Mexico City newspaper Excelsior, published on Nov. 4, 1970.
[138] See New York Times, Nov. 9, 1970.
[139] Chile received during the Allende period a total of $947.9 million in new credits extended by Communist and
Western sources, which included $620 million from Soviet and other Communist-bloc countries. These figures
do not include ongoing disbursements under previous commitments. For example, the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) disbursed $46.2 million to Chile in the Allende period, with the yearly average during
that period in fact larger than the disbursements by the IDB to Chile during any single year from 1964 to 1970.
See US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States and Chile During the Allende Years, 1970-
1973, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
1975, pp. 324, 447; US Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973, Staff Report, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 32; Report
by the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, Jan. 28, 1974, on Chile’s internal situation and
external financing needs (Organization of American States Series H/XIV, CIAP/650), pp. V14-V15.
XVIII
An Invitation to Peking
[140] Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 97.
[141] See New York Times, June 18, 1970.
[142] Edgar Snow, “China Will Talk from a Position of Strength,” Life, July 30, 1971, p. 24.
[143] Time, Oct. 5, 1970.
[144] RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 546.
[145] Nixon records that we learned of Mao’s statement “within a few days after he made it.” RN, p. 547. After looking
over my records, I believe that neither Nixon nor I knew of the comments by Mao until they were published by
Life on April 30, 1971, after the Ping-Pong episode. The earliest reference in my records to the fact of a Snow
interview is in a low-level State Department report of April 1, 1971, to the effect that in an interview with Snow
Mao had shown some flexibility regarding Taiwan. Snow wrote again on the same subject in Life, July 30, 1971.
Nixon must have meant that he was aware of the Snow interview before my secret trip, which is correct.
[146] This account is from a UPI story by Arnold Dibble published July 16, 1971.
[147] Armin Meyer, our Ambassador in Tokyo, gives this account and justly praises Cunningham for his role. Armin H.
Meyer, Assignment Tokyo: An Ambassador’s Journal (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), pp. 130-131.
[148] Snow, “China Will Talk from a Position of Strength,” p. 24.
[149] RN, p. 552.
[151] Brandon tells the story with grace and humor in Henry Brandon, The Retreat of American Power (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1973), chapter 11.
[152] Armin H. Meyer, Assignment Tokyo (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), pp. 133-137.
[153] New York Times, Oct. 31, 1971.
XX
Breakthrough on Two Fronts
[154] E.g., RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 523. See also Marquis Childs,
Washington Post, June 1, 1971.
[155] “U.S. Split on Defense Costs, Muskie Told Soviet Premier,” Washington Star, Jan. 26, 1971.
[156] “Senate Panel to Be Informed on Progress in Arms Talks,” Washington Star, Feb. 2, 1971.
[157] “U.S. Negotiator Testifies on Limiting ABMs,” Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1971; “Foster Asks Total Ban on A-Tests,”
Washington Post, Feb. 28, 1971.
[158] United Press International, May 4, 1971.
[159] Senate Reopens Debate Over ABM,” New York Times, April 20, 1971.
[160] “Harvard-M.I.T. Arms Experts Pleased by Nixon’s Move on Talks,” New York Times, May 27. 1971.
XXI
The Tilt: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 1971
[161] SEATO’s membership included the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Thailand (and South Vietnam as a protocol state). CENTO grouped the countries of the so-called
Northern Tier, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, with Britain; the United States was a member in all but name.
[162] Washington Star, May 19, 1971.
[163] The State Department acknowledged on June 22 that its original announcement of the embargo on April 15 did
not mention the fact that earlier transactions would not necessarily be affected by it. See the New York Times,
June 23, 1971.
[164] Dobrynin also gave the gestation period as a year. Jha told Rogers it was two years, and Foreign Minister Singh
gave this figure publicly. After Nixon’s July 15 China announcement, Singh had told the Indian Parliament
cryptically that India had been considering countermeasures to a possible Sino-American rapprochement “for
some time” (see Chapter XIX).
[165] Sydney H. Schanberg, “India Sets Range for Retaliations in East Pakistan,” New York Times, Nov. 29, 1971.
[166] The Article read: “The Government of Pakistan is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against
Pakistan, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United
States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually
agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in
order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request.”
[167] Assurances were given by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, including a letter from President John F.
Kennedy to Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan on Jan. 26, 1962; an aide-memoire presented by the US
Ambassador on Nov. 5, 1962; a public statement by the State Department on Nov. 17, 1962; and an oral promise
by President Lyndon Johnson to Ayub Khan on Dec. 15, 1965.
[168] See the Anderson column in the Washington Post, Dec. 21, 1971, and the minutes of the Dec. 8 WSAG meeting
published in the New York Times, Jan. 15, 1972.
[169] The Washington Post of Dec. 8, 1971, reported on my background briefing with a column headlined, “White
House Softens Pro-Pakistan Stance.” Senator Barry Goldwater was so carried away by my briefing that he
inserted it in toto into the Congressional Record without informing us. Congressional Record (daily ed.), Dec. 9,
1971, p. S21012.
[170] Milton Viorst, “War Odious, but Not Always Evil,” Washington Star, Dec. 11, 1971.
[171] See the New York Times, Jan. 6, 1972; Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1972.
XXII
Crisis in the Alliance
[172] Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World 1945-1973 (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop
Publishers, 1974), pp. 293-295.
XXIII
Vietnam 1970-71: Forcing Hanoi’s Hand
[173] Washington Post editorials, Aug. 28 and Sept. 1, 1970.
[174] See the New York Times, June 16, 1969; The New York Times Magazine, Sept. 21, 1969.
[175] See, e.g., New York Times editorials, Aug. 5, Aug. 21, Aug. 24, Oct. 15, 1969.
[176] They included Henry Jackson, who drafted the letter, Hugh Scott, Mike Mansfield, Barry Goldwater, Jacob Javits,
Warren Magnuson, Bob Doyle, Alan Bible, Thomas J. McIntyre, Winston Prouty, Birch Bayh, Charles Percy, Milton
Young, and Ted Stevens.
[177] “Peace Plan Gets Wide Praise from Hill Leaders and Media,” Washington Post, Oct. 9, 1970.
[178] “Peace Initiative Backed By The Press,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 11, 1970.
[179] Proposed, for example by Morton Halperin and Leslie Gelb in the Washington Post, Oct. 11, 1970, and by
Halperin again in the New York Times, Nov. 7, 1970.
[180] Benjamin F. Schemmer, The Raid (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), pp. 243-244.
[181] A handy schedule of a dozen separate planned antiwar rallies and campaigns was published in the Washington
Daily News: see Judy Luce, “Demonstration Timetable Here,” March 31, 1971, P- 3.
[182] Address to the Nation, April 7, 1971; see also news conferences of Feb. 17 and March 4, 1971.
[183] The May 31 proposal as I read it to Xuan Thuy was as follows:
First, we are prepared to set a terminal date for the withdrawal of all our forces from South Vietnam. We
would, as I have indicated earlier, arrange for roughly the same timetable for the withdrawal of other Allied
forces.
Second, the Vietnamese and the other peoples of Indochina should discuss among themselves the
manner in which all other outside forces would withdraw from the countries of Indochina.
Third, there should be a ceasefire in place throughout Indochina, to become effective at the time when
U.S. withdrawals based on the final agreed timetable begin.
Fourth, as part of the ceasefire, there should be no further infiltration of outside forces into the countries
of Indochina.
Fifth, there should be international supervision of the ceasefire and its provisions.
Sixth, both sides should renew their pledge to respect the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords, to respect the
neutrality, territorial integrity, and independence of Laos and Cambodia. This could be formalized at an
international conference.
Seventh, I want to reiterate our proposal for the immediate release of all prisoners of war and innocent
civilians held by both sides throughout Indochina. We believe this issue should be settled immediately on a
humanitarian basis. If this is not done, the men must be released as an integral part of the settlement we are
proposing in our final offer. We would expect:
— Your side would present a complete list of all prisoners held throughout Indochina on the day an
agreement is reached.
— The release of the prisoners would begin on the same day as our withdrawals under the agreed
timetable.
— The release of prisoners would be completed at least two months before the completion of our final
withdrawals.
We are prepared to talk concretely and to make rapid progress. We have framed this offer to respond to
your proposals. We expect that you will deal with our final proposals in a constructive spirit.
[184] Walters handed over the text of our new eight points:
1. The United States agrees to the total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. forces and other
foreign forces allied with the government of South Vietnam. This withdrawal will be carried out in the following
manner:
— All American and allied forces, except for a small number of personnel needed for technical advice,
logistics, and observance of the ceasefire mentioned in point 6, will be withdrawn by July 1, 1972, provided that
this statement of principles is signed by December 1, 1971. The terminal date for these withdrawals will in no
event be later than seven months after this statement of principles is signed.
— The remaining personnel, in turn, will be progressively withdrawn beginning one month before the
Presidential election mentioned in point 3 and simultaneously with the resignations of the incumbent President
and Vice President of South Vietnam also provided for in point 3. These withdrawals will be completed by the
date of the Presidential election.
2. The release of all military men and innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina will be carried out
in parallel with the troop withdrawals mentioned in point 1. Both sides will present a complete list of military
men and innocent civilians held throughout Indochina on the day this statement of principles is signed. The
release will begin on the same day as the troop withdrawals and will be completed by July 1, 1972, provided this
statement is signed by December 1, 1971. The completion of this release will in no event be later than seven
months after this statement is signed.
3. The following principles will govern the political future of South Vietnam:
The political future of South Vietnam will be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide for
themselves, free from outside interference.
There will be a free and democratic Presidential election in South Vietnam within six months of the
signature of the final agreement based on the principles in this statement. This election will be organized and
run by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam which will assume its
responsibilities on the date of the final agreement. This body will, among other responsibilities, determine the
qualification of candidates. All political forces in South Vietnam can participate in the election and present
candidates. There will be international supervision of this election.
One month before the Presidential election takes place, the incumbent President and Vice President of
South Vietnam will resign. A caretaker Administration, headed by the Chairman of the Senate, will assume
administrative responsibilities except for those pertaining to the election, which will remain with the
independent election body.
The United States, for its part, declares that it:
— will support no candidate and will remain completely neutral in the South Vietnamese election.
— will abide by the outcome of this election and any other political processes shaped by the South
Vietnamese people themselves.
— is prepared to define its military and economic assistance relationship with any government that exists
in South Vietnam.
Both sides agree that:
— South Vietnam, together with the other countries of Indochina, should adopt a foreign policy of
neutrality.
— Reunification of Vietnam should be decided on the basis of discussions and agreements between North
and South Vietnam without constraint and annexation from either party, and without foreign interference.
4. Both sides will respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. There
will be no foreign intervention in the Indochinese countries and the Indochinese peoples will be left to settle by
themselves their own affairs.
5. The problems existing among the Indochinese countries will be settled by the Indochinese parties on
the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each
other’s affairs. Among the problems that will be settled is the implementation of the principle that all armed
forces of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers.
6. There will be a general ceasefire throughout Indochina, to begin when the final agreement is signed. As
part of the ceasefire, there will be no further infiltration of outside forces into any of the countries of Indochina.
7. There will be international supervision of the military aspects of this agreement including the ceasefire
and its provisions, the release of prisoners of war and innocent civilians and the withdrawal of outside forces
from Indochina.
8. There will be an international guarantee for the fundamental national rights of the Indochinese
peoples, the neutrality of all the countries in Indochina, and lasting peace in this region.
Both sides express their willingness to participate in an international conference for this and other
appropriate purposes.
[185] McGovern quoted in Washington Post, Jan. 4, 1972.
[186] Muskie and Humphrey quoted in Newsweek, Feb. 7, 1972.
XXIV
Nixons Trip to China
[187] RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 560-564.
[188] Ross Terrill, Flowers on an Iron Tree: Five Cities of China (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1975). p. 171.
[189] The complete text of the Shanghai Communiqué is as follows:
JOINT COMMUNIQUE
February 28,
Shanghai, People’s Republic
of China
President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People’s Republic of China at the
invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People’s Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972.
Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President
Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.
President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The
two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.
During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier
Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of
China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and
Foreign Minister Chi P’eng-fei held talks in the same spirit.
President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they
also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar
places of interest.
The leaders of the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have
this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety
of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking
place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.
The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate
tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace:
just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it
removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for
all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to
reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to
lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat
each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge.
No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the
common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their
destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-
point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a
basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages
the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each
country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea;
the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased
communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with
Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council
Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and
Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the
ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape
their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power
rivalry.
The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence,
nations want liberation and the people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All
nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully
the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The
Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and
liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their
own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own
countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be
withdrawn to their own countries.
The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts
for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems
in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly
supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the “U.N. Commission
for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.” It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese
militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people’s desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and
neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations
resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories
and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government
and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and
Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.
There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign
policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their
relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression
against other states, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat
of force. The United States and the People’s Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their
mutual relations.
With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:
— progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests
of all countries;
— both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
— neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other
country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
— neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or
understandings with the other directed at other states.
Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major
country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into
spheres of interest.
The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The
Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of
relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole
legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the
liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S.
forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any
activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan.” “one China, two governments.” “two Chinas,”
and “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.”
The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait
maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not
challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese
themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and
military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military
installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.
The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this
end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which
people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the
further development of such contacts and exchanges.
Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that
economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the people of the two countries.
They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.
The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a
senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of
relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.
The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects
for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two
countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of
tension in Asia and the world.
President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious
hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People’s Republic of China.
XXV
Hanoi Throws the Dice
[190] Safire’s account, from the speech-writing perspective, is in Before the Fall (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co.,
1975), pp. 417-420.
[191] See, e.g., RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 591.
[192] RN, pp. 590-591.
XXVI
The Secret Trip to Moscow
[193] See Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch: A Memoir (New York: Quadrangle Books/The New York Times Book Co.,
1976), pp. 152-163.
[194] New York Times, Feb. 9, 1972. The Los Angeles Times on Feb. 4 even returned to the concept of an ABM-only
agreement.
[195] See, e.g.. Tad Szulc, in “How Kissinger Did It: Behind the Vietnam Cease-Fire Agreement,” Foreign Policy, no. 15
(Summer 1974), and in The Illusion of Peace (New York: The Viking Press, 1978), pp. 544-545. Szulc claims this
was the first explicit US proposal of a cease-fire in place that dropped the demand for mutual withdrawal. In fact,
a cease-fife in place had been proposed in the President’s speech of Oct. 7, 1970. Any expectation of negotiating
a mutual withdrawal was dropped in the secret proposal of May 31, 1971—and indeed implicitly in our
acceleration of unilateral withdrawals. A cease-fire in place was offered again in our secret proposal of Oct. 11,
1971, and publicly in the President’s January 25, 1972, speech. All that was left of mutual withdrawal in our 1971-
72 proposals was the provision that “the problems existing among the Indochinese countries will be settled by
the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and
noninterference in each other’s affairs. Among the problems that will be settled is the implementation of the
principle that all armed forces of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers.”
[196] See RN, p. 592.
[198] Excerpts from Nixon’s April 30 memorandum to me are printed in RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York:
Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 593-594.
[199] See RN, p. 594.
[200] I was not present at the May 8 leadership meeting. An account of it is in William Safire, Before the Fall (Garden
City: Doubleday & Co., 1975), pp. 422-427.
[201] The Senators are quoted in Congressional Quarterly, May 13, 1972.
[202] New York Times editorial, May 9, 1972.
[203] New York Times, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, and Boston Globe editorials of May 10, 1972.
[204] Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), p. 310.
[205] This memorandum is quoted in RN, pp. 606-607.
[207] Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), p. 328.
[208] The text of the Middle East section of the 1972 US-Soviet communiqué was as follows:
The two Sides set out their positions on this question. They reaffirm their support for a peaceful
settlement in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242.
Noting the significance of constructive cooperation of the parties concerned with the Special
Representative of the UN Secretary General, Ambassador Jarring, the US and the USSR confirm their desire to
contribute to his mission’s success and also declare their readiness to play their part in bringing about a peaceful
settlement in the Middle East. In the view of the US and the USSR, the achievement of such a settlement would
open prospects for the normalization of the Middle East situation and would permit, in particular, consideration
of further steps to bring about a military relaxation in that area.
[209] The “general working principles” worked out with Gromyko as a result of the May 1972 summit discussions read
as follows:
1. The final agreement should be comprehensive, covering all parties and issues. This does not preclude
that the implementation occurs in stages or that some issues and disputes are resolved on a priority basis.
2. The agreement should contain provisions for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories
occupied in 1967.
3. Any border rectifications, which may take place, should result from voluntary agreement among the
parties concerned.
4. Mutual arrangements for security could include demilitarized zones, the temporary stationing of UN
personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh, and the most effective international guarantees with the appropriate participation
of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. The agreements should lead to an end of a state of belligerency and the establishment of peace.
6. Freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal should be assured. This is fully
consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal.
7. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one
of the basic principles on which the settlement must be based.
Unilateral Points:
The US position is that completion of the agreements should at some stage involve negotiations among
the signatories.
The Soviet position is that the problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just basis and in
accordance with the appropriate UN decisions.
XXIX
Summit Aftermath
[210] The conventional revisionist view is well exemplified by the series of articles by George W. Ball in the Washington
Star, March 14-16, 1979; and Ball’s letter to the editor of The Economist, Feb. 17, 1979.
[211] Compare the Washington Post editorials of June 7 and July 27, 1971, with its editorials of Oct. 7, 1972, and Feb.
21, 1973.
XXX
Sadat Expels the Soviets
[212] See Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 219, 221-222. Sadat made the
same point in his address to the Israeli Knesset on Nov. 20, 1977.
[213] See Marilyn Berger, “Envoy ‘Paper’ Compromises U.S. in Mideast,” Washington Post, June 29, 1971.
[214] Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 225.
[215] See Chapter XXVIII, note 4.
[216] Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 229.
[217] Ibid.
XXI
From Stalemate to Breakthrough
[218] The US draft of the relevant article was as follows:
The Composition of the Committee will be as follows:
— Representatives of the Republic of Vietnam to be designated by the Government of the Republic of
Vietnam;
— Representatives of the NLF to be designated by the NLF;
— Representatives of various political and religious tendencies in South Vietnam associated neither with
the Government of the Republic of Vietnam nor the NLF but designated by mutual agreement between the
Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the NLF.
President Thieu and his staff gave us a proposed redraft, as follows:
The Committee will be composed of representatives of all the political, religious forces and tendencies in
SVN [South Vietnam]. The NLF is considered as one of the above. The representatives will be designated by
mutual agreement.
We preferred to be specific because it gave Hanoi the tripartite form while draining it of substance. Our scheme
transformed the coalition government into an electoral commission with a fifty-fifty split and a Saigon veto. In
our judgment Saigon’s formulation was less favorable to its own cause because it would have given the NLF a
veto over even the Saigon representatives on the Committee.
[219] See RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 690.
[220] See Charles W. Colson, Born Again (Old Tappan, N.J.: Chosen Books, Inc., 1976), p. 76.
[221] The result can best be judged by comparing Hanoi’s original draft with the version that emerged on October 11.
Le Duc Tho’s draft of October 8 read:
Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of
national concord, equality, mutual respect, and mutual non-elimination to set up the three-segment
administration of national concord and to settle all other internal matters of South Viet Nam in keeping with the
South Viet Nam people’s aspirations for peace, independence, democracy, and neutrality. The two South
Vietnamese parties shall as soon as possible sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Viet Nam, and
not later than three months after the enforcement of cease-fire.
The version on October 11 read:
Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of
national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect, and mutual non-elimination to set up an administrative
structure called the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments. The
Council shall operate on the principle of unanimity. After the National Council of National Reconciliation and
Concord has assumed its functions, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of
councils at lower levels. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of
South Vietnam as soon as possible and do their utmost to accomplish this within three months after the cease-
fire comes into effect, in keeping with the South Vietnamese people’s aspirations for peace, independence and
democracy.
This was weakened further in later negotiations by dropping the phrase “administrative structure,” the
Vietnamese translation of which was controversial. See Chapter XXXIII.
XXXII
The Troubled Road to Peace
[222] RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 693.
[223] See, e.g., Nixon’s news conference of March 15, 1973; his address of March 29, 1973; the joint statement of
Presidents Nixon and Thieu, April 3, 1973; Secretary of Defense Richardson on “Meet the Press,” April 1, 1973;
Richardson testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 2, 1973; Richardson remarks to newsmen
prior to appearing before the House Appropriations Committee, April 3, 1973; my interview with Marvin Kalb,
CBS-TV, February 1, 1973; remarks of Ambassador William Sullivan on “Meet the Press,” Jan. 28, 1973; and other
sources collected in US Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Emergency Military Assistance and
Economic and Humanitarian Aid to South Vietnam, 1975, Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, 94th
Cong., 1st sess., 1975, pp. 19-24.
[224] The relevant assurances I had recited back to Hanoi in a message on October 20 read:
With respect to Cambodia, the U.S. side operates on the basis of the following statements made by
Special Advisor Le Duc Tho at private meetings with Dr. Kissinger on September 26 and 27 and October 8 and 11,
1972:
— “The questions of the war in Vietnam and Cambodia are closely linked: when the war is settled in
Vietnam, there is no reason for the war to continue in Cambodia” (September 27);
— “Once the Vietnam problem is settled, the question of Cambodia certainly will be settled; and the end
of the Vietnamese war will create a very great impact that will end the war in Cambodia perhaps immediately”
(October 8);
— “It is an understanding between us that the DRV will abide by the principle that all foreign forces,
including its own, must put an end to their military activities in Cambodia and be withdrawn from Cambodia and
not be reintroduced” (September 26);
— “The DRV will follow the same principles in Cambodia that it will follow in South Vietnam and Laos, that
is, it will refrain from introducing troops, armament, and war material into Cambodia” (October 11); and
— “As Article 18 [later 23] states, the obligations of this agreement come into force on the day of its
signing” (October 11).
The United States reiterates its view as expounded by Dr. Kissinger on October 11, 1972, that if, pending a
settlement in Cambodia, offensive activities are taken there which would jeopardize the existing situation, such
operations would be contrary to the spirit of Article 15(b) [later 20(b)] and to the assumptions on which this
Agreement is based.
Hanoi confirmed these statements in a written message on October 21 and added a written assurance that it
would “actively contribute to restoring peace in Cambodia.”
[225] What complicated matters even further is that Nixon seemed to be reacting also to messages sent the day before
dealing with an entirely different problem. He seemed to believe that I was determined to go to Hanoi, which the
record does not sustain. And he quotes in his memoirs as a proof (RN, p. 699) a cable from October 21 dealing
with quite a different situation.
On the morning of October 21, when the South Vietnamese team had submitted its twenty-three
proposed changes in the agreement, we were faced with the question of where and how to raise them with the
North Vietnamese. In order to keep Hanoi from going public, I suggested that I might maintain the “shedyule,” go
to Hanoi, put forward the requested changes, and try thus to use my visit as a means to delay a conclusion of the
agreement until after the election. That message arrived in Washington during the night and was thus not acted
on for about twelve hours. (The quote from my cable in RN, p. 699, is from a still earlier cable I sent when I was
under the impression that Saigon would accept the document provided it could get some changes.) By that time
Thieu had canceled the meeting scheduled for later that day and subjected Bunker to the indignities already
described. Under these circumstances I withdrew my original recommendation. Before having any response to
my first message I cabled Haig: “I will do my utmost to prevent a blowup here. In any event I do not see what
Thieu has to gain from it. I will find some pretext for cancelling the trip to Hanoi.” For some reason that second
cable was neither acknowledged nor did it receive a reply. But the first one suggesting the trip to Hanoi be
maintained was the subject of passionate exchanges all the more infuriating because they had meanwhile
become irrelevant.
XXXIII
“Peace Is at Hand”
[226] McGovern’s position was spelled out in his speech of Oct. 10, 1972; see also his appearance on the “Today”
show, April 4, 1972, and his remarks in New Hampshire reported by UPI on Feb. 9, 1972 (re Laos and Cambodia).
[227] New York Times, Nov. 6, 1972. McGovern’s remarks on “Meet the Press” are reported in the Washington Post,
Oct. 30, 1972.
[228] Oriana Fallaci, Interview with History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1977), chapter 1.
[229] See John Osborne in The New Republic, Dec. 16, 1972, reprinted in Osborne, The Fourth Year of the Nixon Watch
(New York: Liveright, 1973), pp. 200-201.
[230] See Chapter XXXII, note 2.
[231] Quoted in William Shawcross, “Sihanouk’s Case,” The New York Review of Books, Feb, 22, 1979.
[232] RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 721.
[233] The full text of the President’s message to me of Dec. 6 is in RN, pp. 729-730.
[234] RN, p. 731.
[235] RN, p. 733.
[236] RN, p. 736.
[237] E.g., Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), p. 413.
[238] Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 21, 1972; Washington Post, Dec. 21, 1972.
[239] Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 413-414 (footnotes omitted).
[240] A good account of the mood of the White House staff can be found in William Safire, Before the Fall (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1975), pp. 666-670.
[241] Charles W. Colson, Born Again (Old Tappan, N.J.: Chosen Books, Inc., 1976), pp. 79-80.